I. Introduction
Exchange rates have recently exhibited considerable volatility and together with prices have failed to conform to the predictions of the purchasing power parity theory. Frequently, exchange rate changes have failed to resemble contemporaneous changes in relative price levels in either magnitude or direction. Exchange rates and their rates of change have been more volatile than relative price levels and rates of inflation. These features of exchange rate behavior have often been regarded as inconsistent with equilibrium, and several disequilibrium interpretations of this anomalous behavior have been suggested. ' This paper proposes an alternative equilibrium explanation of exchange rate behavior. The explanation is based on a model of the simultaneous determination of exchange rates and relative prices of
II. Purchasing Power Parity and the Terms of Trade
Large changes in exchange rates are generally associated with different rates of inflation in the countries concerned. A full model of the foreign exchange market is not required for the inference that a change in the stock of money will, other things the same, be associated with a corresponding increase in all nominal prices including the nominal price of foreign exchange. This result is guaranteed by the zero-degree homogeneity of demands and supplies with respect to all nominal prices. The purchasing power parity hypothesis, which states that there is a proportional relationship between the exchange rate and a ratio of foreign and domestic prices or price indexes, can be thought of as stating that other things are approximately the same. The accuracy of this hypothesis is independent of the accuracy of any particular theory of' exchange rate determination. A rough idea of the accuracy of purchasing power parity can be obtained from the percentage deviations from purchasing power parity with the U.S. dollar, from 1900-1904 to 1963-67, calculated by Gailliot (1970). These are, for Canada .04, France -.01, Germany .04, Italy -.11, Japan .26, Switzerland .14, and the United Kingdom .11 or .02.' Figure 1 shows the ratio of monthly consumer price indexes of France and the United States and the corresponding exchange rate for some recent years. It is apparent that deviations from purchasing power parity persist over time and that exchange rates vary more than ratios of price indexes. Neither phenomenon is unique to France during this time period."
Monetary models of the exchange rate (Frenkel 1976 (Frenkel , 1978 similar to the success of purchasing power parity. There remain substantial short-run variations in exchange rates unexplained by the monetary models. In the explanations of exchange rate fluctuations proposed by Dornbusch (1976a Dornbusch ( , 1976b and Mussa (1976) , the prices of goods available to people in one country change relative to prices of those same goods in another country because domestic nominal prices are temporarily fixed in each country and a monetary shock causes a change in the exchange rate. A nominal shock therefore causes a change in relative goods prices in those models, even if real supplies and demands for goods are unaffected. Other economists (e.g., Balassa 1964) have emphasized changes in the relative prices of traded and nontraded goods. The relative price change that was emphasized most in the traditional literature on foreign exchange markets was the terms of trade.7 Krueger (1969) Kravis and Lipsey (1978) have presented evidence that the exchange rate is correlated with changes in the terms of trade of even disaggregated categories of goods." While the correlation between the exchange rate and the terms of trade is clear, the interpretation is not. In order to examine the equilibrium relationship between the exchange rate and the terms of trade, the next section presents a model in which both are endogenous. 8 During the Civil War, U.S. cotton exports were cut off, resulting in a rise in the price of gold (foreign exchange) relative to purchasing power parity by 20 percent and affecting the terms of trade. After the Civil War, as the supply of goods for export rose again and reduced the terms of trade, the domestic currency appreciated from about 20 percent below purchasing power parity to about 10 percent above purchasing power parity. Later movements in the exchange rate may also have been related to changes in the terms of trade. See Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp. 65-78).
T'he sign indicates that currency depreciations are associated with increases in the relative price of a country's exports. This result does not seem to be due to spurious correlation induced by using the exchange rate in calculating the terms of trade, since the simple. correlation between the log deviation from purchasing power parity and the log of the ratio of' export price indexes, not converted at the exchange rate, is -.77, and the correlation between the log of the exchange rate and the log deviation from purchasing power parity, which would be negative if there were spurious correlation, is in fact .24.
'0 The number of' monthly observations is 43, so the implied t-statistics are -1.9, -1.0, -2.2, -.9, 1.4, and -1.6. " In Stockman (1979) 1 have outlined an explanation of why equilibrium models can be consistent with this evidence from disaggregated price data. Also, the terms of trade can apparently account for some of the residual variation in monetary models of the exchange rate (see Stockman 1978b).
III. A Model

Overview and Individual Optimization Problems
Consider a world with two countries, two goods, and two moneys. People in country one produce only good one but consume both goods one and two; people in country two produce only good two but consume both goods. Thus there is a complete specialization in production, and trade allows people to consume both goods.
Let {fVL , M`}J be the nominal quantities of moneys one and two that have been issued by the governments of those countries and are used within those countries for domestic transactions. Let {P., P2}, be the sequence of the money-one price of good one and the money-two price of good two, and let et be the price of money two in terms of money one. (I will refer to country one as the domestic country, so e is the price of foreign exchange.)
First suppose that M1/P, and M2/P, are constant over time (because demanders of each money want to maintain a money stock with constant purchasing power in terms of the corresponding good). The relative price of good one in terms of good two is T P /eP,. Suppose now that a relative demand shift occurs: The demand for good one falls, the demand for good two rises, and the demands for moneys are unchanged. The ensuing fall in the terms of trade, T, must occur (solely) through a rise in the exchange rate, e, corresponding to a depreciation of domestic money.
By allowing money demands to depend on interest rates or expected inflation rates, one could study the effects of new information about future rates of monetary growth and inflation on the current exchange rate and price level, as in Mussa (1976) or Wilson (1979) . 12 The effects depend on the serial-correlation properties of money and inflation, the interest or expected-inflation elasticity of' the demand for money, etc. I will abstract from these important issues in order to concentrate on the relation between the exchange rate and relative prices. The model presented below introduces transactions and precautionary reasons for holding money and relaxes the assumption above that the real demand for money, in terms of the export good, is constant. The proposition illustrated above-that a shift in supplies or demands for goods induces a change in the exchange ratecontinues to hold. But the result is generalized: A change in the relative price T due to a shift in supplies or demands for goodls will 12 Note that if prices adjust freely, then new iiitorniation about future inflation affects current exchange rates and prices proportionally, so that no deviation fromt purchasing power parity results. Wilson (1979) 
where {c,, C2}t is the stochastic process describing individual two's consumption of goods one and two, U2() (which need not be the same function as U1 ]) gives current-period utility of individual two, and /3 and E are as described before. Production of goods one (in country one) and two (in country two) is exogenously given by the stochastic process {yI,y2}t. Neither good is storable. Assume the process {y,, Y2}t is generated by independent realizations of a random vectoryt from a stationary probability distribution with cumulative distribution function F,(), so the randomness in production is independent over time. The assumptions that output is exogenous, that goods are nonstorable, that production is specialized, and that shocks to production are independent both across goods and over time could all be relaxed with no important change in the results.
International transactions could in principle involve the use of either money for payments. Empirically, roughly two-thirds of international trade contracts appear to be denominated in the seller's currency (Grassman 1973 I assume here that all international transactions are financed with the seller's currency.
Since people demand foreign exchange because they want to purchase foreign goods or assets, the demand for foreign exchange is a derived demand. This was recognized in the traditional exchange rate literature." The traditional elasticities approach formalized the derived demand for foreign exchange in a static model and developed specific formulas for certain cases (e.g., the Marshall-Lerner condition). The formulas obtained depended on the particular assumptions (Mundell 1971, pp. 94-97), but a unifying characteristic of the elasticity models was that they derived the demand for foreign exchange from the demand for foreign goods.
The demands for moneys can be derived from the demands for goods by specifying a simple transactions technology that prevents individuals from engaging in barter. The transactions technology involves a "liquidity constraint" on individual behavior that attempts to reflect the facts that money is held between the transactions for which it is used and that transactions would be more costly without money. The liquidity constraint in this paper requires that goods be purchased with money and that this money be held before it is spent. vidual cannot sell his output for money and instantaneously spend that money for goods; that is, he cannot barter. He carries his receipts from current sales of output into the next period.
Since imports must be financed with foreign exchange (foreign money), the transactions technology applied to imports results in a demand for foreign exchange that is derived from the demand for imports. People, as importers, hold positive balances of' foreign exchange, which they have purchased on the foreign exchange market at the price e.
Let the sequence of events each period be the following: The representative individual in country one enters each period with some domestic money, Ml, which he may use for domestic purchases, and some foreign exchange, Ml, for importing purposes. The superscripts denote the holder of the money (individual one or two); the subscripts denote money one or money two. Individual one then harvests his output,y1, and takes it to market. (Individual two takes2 to market.) He observes the current equilibrium prices (P , P2, and e) at which all trades take place. He purchases consumption goods, obtains the receipts from his sales, then goes to the foreign exchange market to purchase (or sell) foreign exchange to carry into the next period. 
where the transfers T' and T, occur 1)etween periods.
17 I assume that {0}t is the result of' a joint decision of' the governments of' countries one and two. I therefore avoid game-theoretic aspects of the decisions to intervene in the foreign exchange market. Further, it is a matter of indifference (to this Ifodel) which country conducts the foreign exchange market intervention. If'one country has insufficient reserves (of foreign currency) to sell all the foreign money that the intervention decision requires, the other country can always conduct the intervention since it can print the asset to be sold on the foreign exchange market. 'That is, ther e cannot be an international liquidity or reserve problem within this model. Such problems presumably arise in the real world because countries are unable to agree on a choice of' fTl, T2, O}t and are unwilling to cooperate in the foreign exchange market operations required to achieve a target 0. are met.
Equilibrium An equilibrium requires both that people maximize expected utility given rational expectations, that is, that the demand functions solve (13) and (14) when (b"(-) is replaced by b(-) and s' by ((, w'), where G ( ) is such that (15) holds, and that prices clear markets, that is, that the equilibrium conditions (9) hold when the demand functions are inserted. It is straightforward to examine the consumer optimization problem given the behavior of prices as a function of the state vector (summarized by the function tk); the process generating the dynamic behavior of the state vector (summarized by the function G and the probability distribution function F); and, of course, the current state vector (see Stockman 1978b
). The demand functions obtained from the maximization problem have some ambiguous signs for the usual reasons-wealth and substitution effects are not always reinforcing But if substitution effects generally dominate wealth effects and both goods are normal, then increases in initial holdings of either money or in current income result in increases in the demand for both goods and both moneys. Increases in PI result in a decreased demand for good one but increases in the demand for the other good (in the absence of strong complementarity) and increases in the demand for both moneys. Increases in P2 increase the demand for both moneys and the demand for good one while decreasing the demand for good two. Increases in the exchange rate, e, induce increases in the demand for good one and money one and decreases in the demand for good two and money two.'8 As each individual chooses consumption and money holdings taking as given the relation between prices and the state vector and the process generating changes in the state vector, the aggregate behavior of these individuals affects the things that each individual takes as given. While anticipations about the random part of the state vector are rational in the sense that the probability distribution on the exogenous variables is known, anticipations about the I8 Some of these effects become zero when the liquidity constraints become binding as equalities. The optimization problem is analyzed in inore detail in Stockman 1978b. elements of next period's state vector that are the result of (aggregate) individual choices made today are rational in the sense that the individual knows with certainty these aggregate choices and makes his own plans accordingly. As all individuals do this, their choicesform the aggregate choice that each takes as given. Market equilibrium therefore requires that both (9) and (15) hold.19
IV. Implications of the Model
Effect of a Real Shock
The initial effect of a real supply shock can be obtained by differentiating the equilibrium conditions (9). If the output of good one is increased, holding everything else constant including individuals' expectations of the probability distributions on future exogenous variables, then one obtains the exchange rate change and e, is captured in the fourth term, which gives the consequent appreciation of' the exchange rate. This is the term emphasized in the monetary approach to the exchange rate and balance of payments. The first term, which does not depend on income elasticities of demand, gives the effect on the exchange rate as the relative price of goods changes due to an increase in the supply of good one. This term is generally positive (the exception obviously being a case in which income effects of a price change dominate substitution effects). The second and third terms give the effect on e of' changes in the demands for each good induced by the change in income. These terms comprise two effects. First, given the demands for moneys (as in the example at the beginning of Section III), shifts in demands for goods due to a change in income may induce a change in the relative prices of goods and hence in the exchange rate. Second, the budget constraint guarantees that, given c'Y and ML" the larger ,1 the smaller the increase in the demand for foreign exchange as income rises, therefore the larger the appreciation of domestic money due to a rise in y1. Note that the magnitude of the exchange rate change, which is associated with the relative price change caused by the supply shock, depends (in a somewhat complicated way) on the elasticities of demand for both goods and moneys.
(-), V2(-), d'(-), and d2(-) with the desired properties for each j(-) and G (-), and there is some j)(-) that satisfies (9) (the equilibrium conditions) for each d'( ), d2( ), and G ( ). So the set of functions (17) with the desired properties exists if there is a function G( ) satisfying (15). Denote z' G*(s)
A similar expression can be derived for the change in the exchange rate due to an increase in Y2y These expressions give the changes in the exchange rate and prices of goods given the other elements of the state vector. They may be regarded as expressions for the change in prices, fromt one period to the next as a new realization ofy is realized, that would occur if the only change ins were the change iny. But this will not generally be the case: Aside from changes in money supplies through transfer payments and the extent of government transactiolns ol the foreign exchange market, y, and y' will generally change The highest indifference curve that can be attained at B is U (I am assuming for simplicity that the utility functions of the two representative individuals are identical and homothetic). If the exchange rate were unchanged, people would attempt to move along a budget line , to a preferred position by purchasing less of good one and more of good two. Individuals in country one therefore increase their demand for foreign exchange to purchase these imports; individuals in country two supply less foreign exchange because of their reduced demand for country one's good at this relative price. Consequently, the price of money two in terms of money one will rise until the relative price of good one, p1/ep2, has fallen to a point where , is tangent to U at B. Then the foreign exchange market (and each goods market) clears. The change in the terms of trade has been divided between changes in nominal export prices and the exchange rate.
Suppose the utility function of each individual is U 5(c,1 + c) -(c2 ? c) + 5cC2. Suppose that initial production is at= 2, Y2 3. Now let production change toy2 3,Y2 = 2. Initially the relative price of the two goods is 16/9. Now, since each nominal price is determined by a simple quantity theory with unit velocity, the exchange rate is Ms 3 9 27 M2 2 16 32
With the production change and constant money supplies, the exchange rate becomes proportional to 2/3 times 16/9, or 32/27. The new relative price of good one in terms of' good two is 9/16. The money-one price of good one is reduced by about one-half, while the money-two price of good two is increased by about one-third. The increase in the exchange rate of about two-fifths accounts for the remainder of the reduction in the relative price of' good one by about two-thirds. The depreciation of money one is associated in this example with a "worsening" of' country one's terms of' trade, that is, a decrease in the relative price of its export good.
Other things the same, the lower the marginal rate of' substitution between goods one and two the larger the depreciation of' money one relative to money two required for equilibrium. If the marginal rate of' substitution between the goods is greater in the long run than in the short run then the exchange rate will depreciate more in the short rule than in the long run even if production remains at point B. This "overshooting" by the exchange rate of its long-run value resembles a conclusion reached by Dornbusch, but here it can occur as an equilibrrlui phenomenon.
While a change in the terms of trade is associated with a change in the exchange rate, government exchange market transactions cannot succeed at affecting the terms of trade. If the government of' country one were to attempt to depreciate domesticc money by purchasing foreign money on the foreign exchange market, M:') would fall and M', would rise. As a result, p, and e would rise and p2 would fall, but p 1/pe2 would remain approximately unchanged. (The qualifier is necessary because of the distribution effects associated with changes in the values of moneys caused by the government transactions.) The reason that government exchange market transactions cannot exploit the relationship between the exchange rate and the terms of trade is that the exchange rate change did not "cause" the terms of trade change (although it may appear that way to some people living in this hypothetical world) but was merely one way in which the terms of' trade change occurred.
A producer of good one (individual one) may reasonably regard the exchange rate increase as undesirable in the sense that he would prefer to be producing a relatively more valuable good. These same individuals would be roughly indifferent to a change in the exchange rate that was accompanied by changes in all other nominal prices. In an extended model in which people are uncertain about whether an exchange rate change is associated with a "real" or "nominal" disturbance, people may reasonably be concerned about any exchange rate change, since people will rationally impute some part of that change to real factors and some part to nominal factors. Although in this model people were assumed to know the current state vector, in a inore general model with incomplete current information, monetary changes, including those due to foreign exchange market operations, might have some real effects. It seems unlikely, however, that such a model would imply that monetary policy could have any systematic effect on relative prices that could provide a theoretical justification for any particular government foreign exchange market policy.
If the government of country one were to peg the exchange rate, then figure 1 would be unchanged but nominal money supplies would change by (dM`1 + edM`l = 0, M', rising in the example above. Thusp, and P2 would change proportionally to the money supply changes in addition to the changes due to the real disturbance. So p will rise more than if the exchange rate had been flexible and money supplies constant, and p2 will fall more than in that case. The deviation from purchasing power parity will, therefore, be roughly the same under either exchange rate system, although in the flexible exchange rate case it will occur partially through exchange rate changes while in the pegged exchange rate case it will occur solely through changes in nominal export prices.
V. Conclusions
There are two interpretations of the relationship between changes in the terms of' trade and changes in the exchange rate. According to one interpretation, the forces that cause the change in the exchange rate also cause a change in the terms of trade because prices of goods do not adjust to clear markets. The change in relative pr-ices is therefore a disequilibrium phenomenon. This interpretation can be found in Dornbusch (1976a Dornbusch ( , 1976b , Dornbusch and Krugman (1976), and Isardl (1977) . Another version of the disequilibrium interpretation can be found in Negishi (1968) and Kemp (1969, chap. 14) . This version begins with a two-country, two-good, two-money model with complete specialization in production and formally differentiates the system with respect to the exchange rate, allowing prices to change but not allowing asset stocks to change. That is, the exchange rate is assumed to change even though no policy variables have changed: There is no change in either money supply and there are no government foreign exchange market actions. This "short-run" analysis allows one to derive some of the formulas presented by earlier foreign exchange market theorists. The associated "long-run analysis" involves changes in policy variables and hence money supplies, but then either the elasticities of demand and supply of' goods have rno effect the final equilibrium or they affect it only insofar as shifts in demand cause changes in real incomes and hence changes in the demands f'or domestic moneys (Mussa 1974) . This paper has presented an alternative equilibrium interpretation of the elasticity approach to the foreign exchange market and of the relation between the terms of trade and the exchange rate. Domestic money is demanded because it provides the particular services of allowing people to transact (cheaply) in domestic markets to purchase goods, and foreign exchange is demanded by importers because it is used to finance imports, purchase foreign assets, an(1 so on. Other things the same, the demand for foreign exchange depends on the exchange rate. But as Friedman (1953, pp. 159-60) noted: "I'he changes continuously taking place in the conditions of international trade alter the 'other things' and so the desirabilities of' using the currencies of various countries for each of the purposes listed. The aggregate effect is at one time to increase, at another to decrease, the amount of a country's currency demanded at any given rate of exchange relative to the amount offered for sale at that rate."
Real supply and demand shocks affect both relative prices and the derived demand for foreign exchange. A shock that increases the demand for Japanese television sets may also increase the derived demand for yen to import those sets, so the derived demand for foreign exchange is affected as people substitute between domestic and foreign goods (Machlup 1972, p. 35 ). Friedmnan and Schwartz (1963, p. 78), in explaining why the U.S. dollar did not depreciate by even more than it did during the greenback era, suggest that economic growth improved "the competitive position of the United States in exports more than it had expanded its demand for imports, which is to say, had increased the demand for U.S. dollars by foreigners (to buy U.S. exports) more than it had increased the demand for foreign currency by U.S. residents (to buy imports). The effect of such a shift in comparative advantage would be to raise the value of the U.S. currency in terms of foreign currencies at which trade would balance," that is, relative to purchasing power parity. The changes in the demand for foreign exchange that result from real supply and demand shocks affect the equilibrium exchange rate. Therefore changes in the terms of trade are associated with changes in the exchange rate. This paper has shown that deviations from purchasing power parity and exchange rate volatility can be consistent with an equilibrium framework with strong roots in traditional theory of foreign exchange markets (e.g., Friedman 1953 and Machlup 1972) . The theory also accounts for a correlation between the exchange rate and the terms of trade. In contrast to pure monetary models of the exchange rate, the theory provides a rationale behind the frequently encountered popular statements that appreciation of a currency is related to a fall in the country's import prices and a rise in the foreign price of its exports, and that a balance of trade deficit or the anticipation of a balance of trade deficit may be associated with a currency depreciation. Since changes in relative prices occur partially through changes in exchange rates, people may care about the level of the exchange rate in the sense that they care about the relative price of domestic and foreign export goods. People may blame a relative price change on the exchange rate for the same reason they may blame inflation on whatever good happened to suffer the greatest relative price increase during the inflation. Since exchange rate changes are simply one of the ways in which the terms of trade change occurs, the equilibrium version of the elasticities approach leads to an entirely different interpretation of' the correlation between the exchange rate (or deviations from purchasing power parity) and the terms of trade than is suggested by the disequilibrium models.
While changes in the terms of trade occur partially through changes in the exchange rate, not all changes in the exchange rate are associated with changes in the terms of trade. A currency reform in one country that left unchanged the distribution of' wealth would change the price of foreign exchange along with all other nominal prices. In this sense, changes in the exchange rate may be caused by either real or monetary factors.
It follows that government foreign exchange market policies will not be able to exploit the relationship between the exchange rate and the terms of trade in order to achieve a desired terms of or balance of' trade. If the relationship between the exchange rate and the terms of' trade is due to shifts in the underlying real supplies and demands for foreign or domestic goods, it will not be substantially affected by government foreign exchange market transactions. When a change in the exchange rate is due to such changes in real conditions, government foreign exchange market policies can reverse the change in the exchange rate only by affecting general price levels it cannot reverse the changes in real conditions that originally caused the exchange rate movement. Other policies such as tariffs, quotas, and controls on foreign exchange transactions may affect the exchange rate indirectly by directly affecting the terms of trade (Cassel 1922, pp. 147-62; Friedman 1953, pp. 167-69) but foreign exchange market transactions cannot be used as a tool by policymakers to exploit the exchange rate-terms of trade correlation.
There appear to be several types of empirical evidence that could be used to discriminate between the equilibrium explanation of exchange rate determination presented in this paper and the disequilibrium explanations that were discussed above, short of estimating an entire general equilibrium structural model. First, the equilibrium theory implies that deviations from purchasing power parity and changes in the terms of trade are essentially real phenomena that will not be systematically related to the exchange rate system (except insofar as different exchange rate systems are associated with different characteristics of monetary policy-e.g., greater variability in the unanticipated component of the money supply might be associated with greater variability of relative prices along the lines of Barro [1976] ). Ignoring the distribution effects of money supply changes and the consequent effects on relative prices, a change in the money supply affects the exchange rate only by affecting the general level of nominal variables and cannot reverse the change in real factors that caused the changes in the terms of trade and the exchange rate. Government monetary or exchange rate policy can, therefore, only add a nominally induced change in the exchange rate to a relativeprice-induced change in the exchange rate and, hence, cannot affect the terms of trade or the deviation from purchasing power parity. In pairs of countries with relatively greater differences in monetary policies and inflation rates, a greater fraction of exchange rate changes will be due to monetary rather than real changes and the correlation between the exchange rate and the terms of trade will be less pronounced, but the terms of trade and the deviations from purchasing power parity will be unaffected.
Second, the expected rate of change of the exchange rate, as revealed on the forward foreign exchange market (Stockman 1978a) should be related to anticipated changes in the terms of trade or factors associated with the terms of trade as well as to the anticipated inflation differential. (This may explain the widely discussed role of the recent U.S. trade deficits in affecting the performance of the dollar on foreign exchange markets.) Third, applied work on the "real side of international trade" should, according to the equilibrium theory, be able to explain relative prices of goods in international trade without making important reference to monetary variables or to the exchange rate system. The exchange rate should enter such studies only as part of measured relative prices.
Further work on the theory presented here might focus on a more detailed characterization of the properties of the equilibrium exchange rate. Another extension would be to include more goods or introduce information, search, or transportation costs that prevent perfect arbitrage in the markets for each good. Other extensions might involve an explicit consideration of prior contracting in international trade or the separation of individual consumers and firms that import foreign goods.
If the theory presented here is true, then government foreign exchange market and monetary policy cannot exploit the relationship between the exchange rate and the terms of trade. Government policies should therefore be directed at other goals not discussed in this paper, such as minimizing the amount of noise in the signals carried by market prices. The choice of a pegged versus flexible exchange rate system can then be based on the classic arguments for each system, such as disciplining the monetary authorities or minimizing adjustment costs (Friedman's "daylight-savings-time" argument) or choosing some rate of inflation that may differ from the foreign rate. A persuasive argument for flexible rates might be to eliminate a constraint on monetary policy in order to make that policy steady and predictable. Although people may quite rationally care about the level of the exchange rate, its changes are only associated with, not causes of, the relative price changes which are really important.
